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Abstract
We study the impact of Ecuador’s national forest conservation incentives program
on reported land conflicts. Data come from a survey of >900 households located
within 49 indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian communities holding communal conservation contracts. We use quasi-experimental methods to test for relationships between
program participation and changes in land conflicts. Respondents reported that the
program reduced land conflicts when households resided in communities with de
facto communal tenure arrangements (vs. de facto semiprivate arrangements). We find
no evidence that the conservation incentive program increased land conflicts. These
results counter concerns that conservation payments undermine land tenure security;
in some cases perceived tenure security is improved.
KEYWORDS
impact evaluation, land conflicts, land tenure, payment for ecosystem services, quasi-experimental, Socio
Bosque

I N T RO D U C T I O N

The conservation community is increasingly attendant to the
relationship(s) between tenure security and the success of
conservation interventions (Robinson et al., 2018). With the
rise of payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs in
the Global South, the focus has shifted to the connections
and feedbacks between these programs and tenure security
(Davis & Goldman, 2017; Naughton-Treves & Wendland,
2014). Some warn that PES programs may undermine local
rights and weaken tenure security (Sandbrook et al, 2010;
Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010; Sikor et al., 2010), while
others suggest PES programs may increase participants’ perceived tenure security (Bremer, Farley, & Lopez-Carr, 2014a;
Jones et al., 2017). There are few impact evaluations testing whether participation in PES programs changes perceived

tenure security. One exception is a comparative study that estimated the effect of tenure clarification projects that were part
of the PES intervention on perceived tenure security (Sunderlin et al., 2018).
In this paper we provide national-level evidence on the
impact of a payment-based forest conservation program on
perceived tenure security. Tenure security is often conceptualized as the “assurances” of landholders that their land tenure
will be upheld by society (Arnot, Luckert, & Boxall, 2011;
Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000; van Gelder, 2010), with conflict
being one factor influencing tenure security (Robinson et al.,
2018). We study the relationship between participation in
Ecuador’s Socio Bosque program and reported land conflicts
by households living in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian
communities holding communal conservation contracts.
Launched in 2008, Socio Bosque has enrolled 16,000 km2 of
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land, the majority (14,500 km2 ) held in community contracts
(N = 196). Many of these contracts are with indigenous or
Afro-Ecuadorian communities who own the largest share of
native forest in Ecuador and who struggle with land incursions and uncertain access rules (Morales, Naughton-Treves,
& Suárez, 2010). Socio Bosque aims to: protect biodiversity
and ecosystem services, improve socio-economic conditions,
and improve natural resource governance (de Koning et al.,
2011). Relative to research on forest outcomes, empirical
studies of the socioeconomic or institutional outcomes of
Socio Bosque are few: previous studies have focused on
equity and livelihood concerns but not explicitly on tenure
security (Bremer, Farley, Lopez-Carr, & Romero, 2014b;
Hayes, Murtinho, & Wolff, 2015; Krause & Loft, 2013;
Nogüés & Moretta, 2017; Yanez, 2016).

2 THEORY OF CHANGE LINKING
SOCIO BOS Q U E TO T E N U R E
SECURITY
The Socio Bosque program prioritizes areas based on deforestation threat, ecosystem service potential, and poverty rates
(de Koning et al., 2011). To enroll in Socio Bosque, communities must possess de jure communal land titles. Ecuadorian communities customarily designate a portion of their
forested land for conservation, and these are the areas that
communities typically enroll in Socio Bosque contracts (in
full or some portion). Participating communities voluntarily enter contracts with the government to conserve enrolled
land for 20 years. Socio Bosque dictates that communities
use incentive payments for community development projects.
Additionally, some of the money is to be used to adequately
demarcate and protect enrolled land against hunting and deforestation (MAE, 2014). This includes placing signage around
the enrolled property and in some cases hiring community
guards to monitor boundaries (Bremer et al., 2014a; Hayes,
Murtinho, & Wolff, 2017).
We predict Socio Bosque enrollment could strengthen
tenure security by reducing land conflicts (Figure 1). Mechanisms may include demarcating and monitoring property
boundaries (per program requirements), greater confidence in
government backing of tenure claims due to participation in
the program (Bremer et al., 2014a; Jones et al., 2017), and
clarification of community land tenure rules within enrolled
communities (Hayes et al., 2015; Hayes et al., 2017). Alternatively, Socio Bosque could heighten land conflicts and reduce
security if demarcation leads to contested claims about boundary placement (Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro, & Pacheco,
2011). It is also possible that Socio Bosque has no effect on
land conflicts, which would at least demonstrate that PES
has not undermined tenure security. Land conflicts can occur
with internal or external actors, and different mechanisms

may affect these types of conflicts differentially. For example, internal clarification of community land tenure rules is
more likely to reduce internal conflicts whereas heightened
perceptions of government backing is more likely to reduce
conflicts with external actors.
We also expect the effect of PES participation on changes
in tenure security to be moderated by variation in customary
access rules. Beyond de jure communal land tenure designations in Ecuador there is important variation and complexity
in the de facto land tenure (Bennett & Sierra, 2014; Bremner & Lu, 2006; Grey, Bilsborrow, Bremner, & Lu, 2008).
Some communities allow individual households temporary
use of common pool resources, but permanent rights lie with
the larger community. Other communities divide a portion of
common land into tracts managed by individual households,
and although none holds a legal individual land title, each
household maintains its rights regardless of land use. In addition to institutional conditions moderating the impact of Socio
Bosque on tenure security, biophysical (e.g., forest cover, land
size) and socioeconomic (e.g., population size, community
type) context could also influence program impacts (Sills &
Jones, 2018).

3
3.1

M ETH O DS
Survey

Our sample includes 49 indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian
communities in Ecuador’s Amazonian and Northern regions;
25 that are enrolled in Socio Bosque (Figure 2). Treatment
communities were randomly selected; date of enrollment
varied between 2008 and 2013 (S1). Control communities
were selected based on similarities in observable socioeconomic and biophysical characteristics with treatment communities (Arriagada, Cotacachi, Schiling, & Morrison, 2018). A
community-level survey was conducted with leaders and then
households were randomly selected. Surveys were conducted
in early 2017. The sample used in this paper was 932 households; however sample size varies for some analyses.
Our dependent variable is self-reported information on
boundary disputes and land invasions. Retrospective questions were used to gather information on land conflicts before
and after Socio Bosque was implemented (S2). Specifically,
we asked individual households: “Before 2008 (and ‘After
2008 and until today’), were there any disputes or disagreements with anyone over the ownership of land?” Respondents replied either yes or no. Respondents were then asked
about the disputants involved, allowing us to distinguish conflicts with internal actors—within family or community—
and external actors—other individuals, communities, private
industry, or government agencies.
Since there were not baseline data, we used recall data
about land conflicts. To reduce potential bias, the survey team
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F I G U R E 1 Theory of change linking Socio Bosque to changes in tenure security

established a time reference based on historical events (e.g.,
creation of the new Constitution of the Republic in 2008 as
well as specific events identified by the community leaders) and we asked about presence of any conflict (i.e., yes/no
response) versus specific numbers of conflicts (Schaeffer &
Presser, 2003). We did not ask households specifically about
tenure security on lands enrolled in Socio Bosque, as these
lands would have been off limits if under contract and there
would not be comparable areas to ask about in control communities. Instead, each household reported on total area of land
they had access to or could use, including any semiprivate
parcels, communal use lands, and leased or borrowed lands.
Our assumption was that the inputs and activities, and potential mechanisms, induced by participating in Socio Bosque
(Figure 1) would affect tenure security beyond the boundaries
of enrolled lands. Information on the type of land the household had access to (e.g., semiprivate parcels) was used to construct dummy variables for access to de facto communal use
and de facto semiprivate land parcels.
To control for other factors affecting the occurrence of land
conflicts, we selected independent variables from the household survey expected to be correlated with reported land conflicts and enrollment in Socio Bosque (Bremer et al., 2014a;

Hayes et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2017). These included: household family size, slope, total area of land the household had
access to in 2008 and 2016, whether the land they had access
to had forest on it, distance to the nearest market town and
nearest paved road, and whether a household identified as
being indigenous (versus Afro-Ecuadorian or other). We also
used variables on total community population size and land
area (in ha) set aside for communal use in 2008 and 2016 from
the community leaders’ survey to control for factors that might
influence the communal decision to enroll in Socio Bosque
and prevalence of land conflicts.

3.2

Identification strategy

To estimate the average treatment effect for the treated we
combined propensity score matching (PSM) with differencein-differences (DID) to control for observable and timeinvariant nonobservable bias (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).
First, we estimated a propensity score for each household and
then used 1-to-1 PSM without replacement to find the most
similar control observation. All household and community
variables listed above were included in the matching equation, along with regional (Coast, Andes, Amazon) dummy
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F I G U R E 2 Map of study area with community locations

variables. We used a caliper to trim the sample to the best
set of matches (Guo & Fraser, 2010). We checked covariate
balance before and after PSM.
We used our trimmed sample of households in the following fixed effects panel regression:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

(1)

where i represents the household and t time. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is selfreported land conflicts recorded as a “1″ if there was a
land conflict reported in that year and “0″ otherwise. We
controlled for household ( 𝜇𝑖 ) and year ( 𝛽3 ) fixed effects,
and also included regional fixed effects interacted with

year fixed effects ( 𝛽4 ) to account for time-varying characteristics at the regional level (e.g., economic prices) that
might influence tenure security. 𝛽1 is the variable of interest. Household covariates that are time-invariant are controlled for by the household fixed effects; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes
the total area of land the household had access to, community population, and total area of communal use land.
In Equation (1), 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is estimated with cluster robust standard errors at the communal level to account for the clustered assignment of treatment and to control for spatial and
temporal correlation (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, & Wooldridge,
2017).
We estimated Equation (1) as a linear fixed effects panel
regression model. We used a linear probability model over
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Community and household summary statistics for 46 communitiesa

Variable

All households

Socio Bosque households

Non-Socio Bosque households

Report land conflict before 2008 (0/1)

0.210.40

0.260.44

0.150.35

Report land conflict after 2008 (0/1)

0.120.33

0.150.36

0.080.27

Community population in 2008

594.54869.60

437.27199.73

773.381129.91

Communal use lands in 2008 (ha)

1444.142073.10

2016.662412.68

793.031312.16

Household family size

5.442.62

5.782.81

5.062.32

Total area of land household had access to in 2008 (ha)

14.9426.47

16.5227.22

13.1425.50

Household had forest on their land in 2008 (0/1)

0.610.49

0.630.48

0.590.50

Slope (degrees)

2.266.44

2.447.66

2.074.69

Distance to market town (hours)

1.121.13

1.061.07

1.181.19

Distance to paved road (hours)

0.971.48

1.101.71

0.831.16

Indigenous (1/0)

0.840.37

0.930.24

0.720.45

De facto communal land tenure

0.580.49

0.710.43

0.380.49

De facto semiprivate land tenure

0.450.50

0.300.46

0.630.48

N

872

464

408

a

Three communities (60 households) dropped due to missing community-level variables used in matching equation.
Note: Mean values reported with standard deviations in italics.

a nonlinear (binary) model because household fixed effects
cannot be easily included in nonlinear binary-choice models
(Wooldridge, 2010). Linear fixed effects models have been
shown to give almost identical marginal effects at the mean
of the data as nonlinear models with similar identifying
assumptions (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010).
Equation (1) was estimated with 𝑌𝑖𝑡 representing all
land conflicts and then separate regression models were estimated for the sub-set of land conflicts with external versus internal actors. As a robustness check we also estimated
Equation (1) excluding 𝑋𝑖𝑡 variables in case there is endogeneity between the dependent and independent variables. To
test whether the de facto tenure regime moderated the impact
of Socio Bosque on reported land conflicts we added an interaction term between de facto tenure regime and Socio Bosque
participation ( 𝛽1 ) in Equation (1). We also tested whether the
following noninstitutional variables moderated 𝑌𝑖𝑡 : (1) community population size; (2) size of communal use land; (3)
community type; and (4) presence of forest. Data on community variables were missing for three communities—and
60 households within these communities. We present results
omitting these three communities but including communitylevel variables and results with all 49 communities, but
excluding community-level variables.

4

RESULTS

Overall, reported land conflicts decreased by 9% over time
in our sample (Tables 1 and S1). Reported land conflicts
by households residing in Socio Bosque-enrolled communities decreased by around 11% while in non-Socio Bosque

communities, decreases were closer to 7%. Community leaders enrolled in Socio Bosque reported smaller total population sizes and more communal use land than those not
enrolled. Households within Socio Bosque-enrolled communities reported larger household sizes and more access to
land than non-Socio Bosque households. About 60% of all
households reported forest on the land they had access to.
Households reported being located on average one hour from
the nearest market town or paved road. More than 80% of
respondents self-identified as indigenous. Seventy percent of
households within communities enrolled in Socio Bosque
reported that they had access to de facto communal use
parcels, whereas non-Socio Bosque households were more
likely to report access to de facto semiprivate parcels of land
(63%).
While most covariates were statistically different between
Socio Bosque and non-Socio Bosque households before
matching, PSM considerably improved observable covariate balance as illustrated by differences in means and normalized differences in means (Table 2). Covariate balance
across community-level variables was not achieved when
community-level variables were excluded from the matching
equation (Table S2).
Estimating Equation (1) using the full sample, households
participating in Socio Bosque were no more likely to report
a change in land conflicts than nonparticipant households
(Table 3). The same is true when Equation (1) was estimated
separately for conflicts with external versus internal actors.
The effect of Socio Bosque participation on reported changes
in land conflicts did vary by de facto land tenure: households
with access to de facto communal use land and enrolled in
Socio Bosque were more likely to report a decrease in land
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TABLE 2

Covariate balance before and after matching using 46 communitiesa
Difference in meansb
after matching(with
community variables)

Standardized differences in
meansc after propensity score
matching(with community
variables)

Community population in 2008

Difference in meansb
before matching (with
community variables)
5.45**

−0.54

0.04

Communal use lands in 2008 (ha)

−9.42**

−1.58

0.13

Household size

−4.11**
−1.89*

0.24

0.02

−0.69

0.06

Variable

Total area of land household had access to
in 2008 (ha)
Household had forest on their land in
2008 (0/1)

−1.16

1.01

0.09

Slope (degrees)

−0.87

−0.49

0.04

1.52

−0.21

0.02

Distance to market town (hours)

1.03

0.08

Indigenous (1/0)

−2.68**
−8.89**

−0.41

0.03

N

872

588

588

Distance to paved road (hours)

≤ .05;
≤ .01.
Note: To reduce differences at the household and community level we included the following variables in the matching equation: household size, total area of land household
had access to in 2008, whether this land had forest on it, slope, distance to market town and paved road, whether household was indigenous, community population size
in 2008, total communal use lands in 2008, and regional dummy variables. All variables were included in the matching equation.
a
Three communities (60 households) dropped due to missing community-level variables used in matching equation.
b
T-values from two-sample t-tests with unequal variances for differences between Socio Bosque and Non-Socio Bosque households.
c Standardized differences in means normalize the difference based on sample size. A value > .25 is considered large enough to bias parametric regression analysis (Imbens
& Wooldridge, 2009).
*p

** p

TABLE 3

Impact of Socio Bosque on reported changes in land conflicts using 46 communitiesa
All conflicts

Conflicts with
external actors

Conflicts with
internal actors

De facto access to
communal use land

De facto access to
semiprivate land

All households

−0.050
0.046

−0.030
0.028

−0.017
0.030

−0.095
0.057

0.070
0.061

N

1,176

1,176

1,176

1,176

1,176

Omitting households that rented or
b
borrowed land

−0.043
0.046

−0.017
0.029

−0.023
0.028

−0.103
0.056

0.047
0.060

N

1,152

1,152

1,152

1,152

1,152
0.067
0.067

&

&

Omitting households that reported
access to both semiprivate and
c
communal use lands

−0.047
0.046

−0.026
0.029

−0.023
0.029

−0.128*
0.057

N

1,128

1,128

1,128

Omitting households that rented or
borrowed land and that reported
access to both semiprivate and
d
communal use lands

−0.054
0.047

−0.028
0.028

−0.025
0.030

1,128
−0.135*
0.061

0.065
0.063

N

1,112

1,112

1,112

1,112

1,112

1,128

≤ .05;
≤ .01;
≤ .10.
Note: Linear fixed effects panel regression estimated with program dummy variable, total area of land household had access to in 2008 and 2016, community population
size in 2008 and 2016, total area of communal use land in 2008 and 2016, household fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-year fixed effects. Standard errors were
clustered at the community level. After matching, 294 treatment observations and 294 control observations were retained under “all households.” Minimum detectable
effect size is between 0.07 and 0.11 depending on power level (60–90%) using sample size of 600 (2 groups). Marginal effects reported with standard errors in italics.
a
Three communities (60 households) dropped due to missing community-level variables used in matching equation.
b Drops 22 households that reported only having access to rented or borrowed land, since these households may have different tenure security.
c Drops 44 households that reported access to both semiprivate and communal use lands, since these may represent measurement error since it was often just one household
per community that reported this dual type of access.
d
Drops 22 households that reported only having access to rented or borrowed land and the 44 households that reported access to both semiprivate and communal use lands.
*p

** p

&p
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Impact of Socio Bosque on reported changes in land conflicts using 46 communitiesa and no control variables
De facto access to
communal use land
−0.108*

De facto access to
semiprivate land

All conflicts

Conflicts with
external actors

Conflicts with
internal actors

−0.062
0.045

−0.034
0.027

−0.028
0.029

N

1,176

1,176

1,176

1,176

1,176

Omitting households that rented or
borrowed land

−0.055
0.046

−0.024
0.029

−0.031
0.027

−0.113*
0.052

0.049
0.060

N

1,152

1,152

1,152

1,152

1,152

Omitting households that reported
access to both semiprivate and
communal use lands

−0.050
0.046

−0.025
0.028

−0.032
0.029

−0.125*
0.054

0.070
0.067

N

1,128

1,128

1,128

1,128

1,128
0.067
0.063

1,112

All households

0.051

Omitting households that rented or
borrowed land and that reported
access to both semiprivate and
communal use lands

−0.062
0.046

−0.030
0.028

−0.036
0.029

−0.136*
0.056

N

1,112

1,112

1,112

1,112

0.011
0.061

∗

p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; & p ≤ .10.
Note: Linear fixed effects panel regression estimated with program dummy variable, household fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-year fixed effects, No control
variables included. Standard errors were clustered at the community level. After matching, 294 treatment observations and 294 control observations were retained under
“all households.” Minimum detectable effect size is between 0.07 and 0.11 depending on power level (60–90%) using sample size of 600 (2 groups). Marginal effects
reported with standard errors in italics
a Three communities (60 households) dropped due to missing community-level variables used in matching equation.
b
Drops 22 households that reported only having access to rented or borrowed land, since these households may have different tenure security.
c
Drops 44 households that reported access to both semiprivate and communal use lands, since these may represent measurement error since it was often just one household
per community that reported this dual type of access.
d
Drops 22 households that reported only having access to rented or borrowed land and the 44 households that reported access to both semiprivate and communal use lands.

conflicts of around 0.10%-points. There was no statistically
significant difference in reported land conflicts for households with de facto semiprivate parcels due to Socio Bosque.
Treatment effect results were similar using all 49 communities (Table S3) and when no control variables were included
in Equation (1) (Table 4). Controlling for year of PES enrollment does not change these results (S1). The only consistently
statistically significant noninstitutional moderating factor was
communal land size (Table S4): Socio Bosque reduced land
conflicts when communal use lands were above the median
value but not when they were below the median value.

5

DIS CUSSI O N

During our study, Afro-Ecuadorians and indigenous peoples enjoyed significant gains in their collective land rights
in Ecuador thanks partly to the new 2008 Constitution
(Becker, 2011). Even within the context of these nationallevel changes, we found evidence that Socio Bosque participation led to reductions in reported land conflicts for
some households, indicating a strengthened sense of some
aspects of land tenure security. Just as importantly, we found
no evidence that Socio Bosque participation led to reported
increases in land conflicts. In many cases we found no effect

of the program on land conflicts, which is also a positive result
for tenure security as it indicates that participation in the program did not exacerbate land conflicts. Similarly, Sunderlin
et al. (2018) find no effect of PES on tenure security in three
countries but a positive and negative effect in one country
respectively. Thus, the influence of PES on tenure security
is context dependent.
We found a moderating effect of community de facto land
tenure regimes on the impact of Socio Bosque on reported
land conflicts: households within Socio Bosque-enrolled
communities that had access to communal use land were
more likely to report a decrease in land conflicts than households with access to communal use lands but not enrolled
in Socio Bosque. The moderating effect that informal institutional arrangements can have on tenure security and conservation outcomes has been hypothesized in the literature
(Robinson et al., 2018), but rarely tested (Sills & Jones, 2018).
Semiprivate parcels are likely to be already demarcated within
communities in Ecuador and associated with exclusionary
rights, whereas de facto communal use lands are generally
unlikely to be demarcated and therefore harder to defend
against other actors (Bennett & Sierra, 2014; Bremner & Lu,
2006; Grey et al., 2008).
Turning to potential mechanisms that would explain these
decreases in land conflicts, we cannot rule out any of
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the potential positive mechanisms in Figure 1. Boundary
demarcation and monitoring and enforcement are Socio
Bosque contract requirements. Socio Bosque participation
could lead to decreases in land conflicts by formalizing
boundaries and increasing surveillance for illegal activities.
Leaders in our community surveys reported that they conducted monitoring activities in 24 of the 25 Socio Bosque
communities. Another possible mechanism is the heightened
perception of government engagement. The Socio Bosque
program promised participants government mediation in conflicts on enrolled lands. Evidence that participants pay heed
to these promises comes from field studies in Ecuador (Bremer et al., 2014a; Jones et al., 2017), and in other PES programs (Arriagada, Sills, Pattanayak, & Ferraro, 2009). It is
possible that these assurances allowed community leaders to
ward off other actors with possible government mediation,
and/or such actors would desist given the potential for government intervention. Finally, internal clarification of land tenure
rules has been documented in Socio Bosque communities
(Hayes et al., 2017), and participation in the program could
discourage community members from violating their own
rules.
These results should not be interpreted as causal since we
do not have random assignment of the PES program; however,
within Ecuador, communities were randomly selected and are
representative of the majority of community forest conservation contracts. Our results should be applied with caution to
other payment programs, since the effect of conservation payments on land conflicts will vary due to differences in land
tenure arrangements and PES contract design. Furthermore,
we only measure one aspect of tenure security, and participation in Socio Bosque could have simultaneously affected other
aspects of tenure security.
Despite these caveats, this study presents one of the first
large-N assessments utilizing quasi-experimental methods to
evaluate the counterfactual impact of a conservation payment
program on reported changes in land conflicts. Our results are
important globally for the conservation community, as they
provide rigorous evidence that it is possible to compensate
communities for forest protection without exacerbating land
conflicts, and that these programs can even strengthen perceived tenure security. Improving tenure security outcomes
should have positive impacts on other dimensions of human
well-being and sustainable development, both important targets in the Socio Bosque program and PES interventions
more widely (Blundo-Canto et al., 2018; Liu & Kontoleon,
2018).
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